ABSTRACT A method is proposed to improve system reliability in terms of self-detection and isolation of discrete faults. The application of this method on the design of built-in tests for maintenance is presented using the case of aircraft environmental control system maintenance testing. Built-in testing during aircraft on-ground maintenance allows for wider system input variability due to the absence of operational constraints and requirements. This provides an opportunity to optimally design tests that improve the fault detection and isolation capabilities for operators and maintenance crews. A general mathematical framework for built-in test design is shown using a model-based active fault detection and isolation technique. The motivation for this paper is first illustrated through a case study showing the inability to detect and isolate faults at different conditions, demonstrating how system states contribute to these issues. The success of the proposed framework is demonstrated by designing built-in tests that are capable of fully detecting and isolating a multiplicity of faults common to aircraft environmental control systems. We conclude by presenting the value of the proposed method of detecting and isolating faults, as a solution to a constrained optimization problem with the admissible system inputs as manipulated variables.
I. INTRODUCTION
The added complexity of modern cyber-physical systems has induced uncertainty and enhanced fault risk during operation. This is typically due to system heterogeneity and non-linearity, the inability to accurately infer variables of interest, and the economic and system-specific limitations in the number and type of sensors used for diagnostics. The goal of fault diagnostics is to alleviate these problems and improve system availability, dependability, reliability, and safety maintenance cost [1] . As a result, fault diagnostics have become an integral part of the design of modern systems and are critical for their normal operation. However, the accuracy and robustness of the fault diagnostic methods commonly employed in maintenance tests, are often troublesome. This has resulted in significant research effort over the past decades to advance the capability of fault diagnostics and prognostics in industries such as aerospace, automotive, and energy [1] - [15] . This paper uses examples from the aerospace industry along with the terminology accepted by the fault diagnosis and aerospace communities (Table 10 in the Appendix) [5] , [16] , [17] , driven by the respective need for improved fault diagnostics. Nonetheless, the method presented here is generic in terms of formulation, theoretical foundation and application and can be applied directly to other systems of other industry sectors.
A. FALSE ALARMS AND NO FAULT FOUNDS IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
The trend towards developing more electric aircraft (MEA) systems to improve energy efficiency [18] - [20] has made the aircraft more complex, further complicating the task of fault detection and isolation (FDI) [17] , [21] - [23] . Therefore, the field of FDI is increasing in significance to the aerospace industry. Problems with fault diagnostics in the aerospace industry include the inability to detect faults, high rates of false alarms, and frequent no fault found (NFF) occurrences.
The lack of robustness in the handling of alarms (true or false) often leads to unscheduled removals of healthy line replaceable units (LRUs) of aircraft systems [16] . As a result, the inability to accurately detect and isolate faults significantly impacts system availability, dependability, safety, and cost. For instance, about 30% to 50% of the LRUs removed in the aerospace industry during maintenance are tagged as NFFs [17] , [21] , [24] . In addition, Williams et al. [25] reported that NFFs are responsible for more than 90% of all maintenance costs in aircraft electronics. Khan et al. [21] , [22] attributed this problem to incorrect system diagnostics and/or the inaccurate replication of field conditions during maintenance diagnostics. They identified intermittent faults as the main problem because of their dependency on system conditions, causing the fault symptom(s) to be absent during ill-designed tests. Often, the conditions in which an alarm is initially triggered are not replicated during maintenance, leading to NFF occurrences [26] - [28] . Improvements to diagnostics and prognostics should reduce NFF occurrences and the subsequent problems associated with high aircraft maintenance costs, lower dispatch reliability, out-of-service incidents, and large numbers of spares [16] .
B. BUILT-IN TESTS FOR SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
There are three classes of faults common to aerospace systems: sensor, actuator, and process faults. These faults may be abrupt, incipient (slowly progressing), or intermittent. As mentioned, incipient and intermittent faults present the greatest amount of difficulty in diagnostics [12] , with common root cause being the lack of robust and precise fault isolation capabilities. The need for improvement of fault isolation methods is thus critical to ensure that robustness, precision, and maintenance time requirements are met. Wu and Campion [29] motivated the need for improved reliability and safety of complex systems and proposed a method to improve FDI of aircraft engine incipient faults using a parametric statistical approach. Khan et al. [22] further discussed this need and how it translates to a need for improving built-in test (BIT) effectiveness. Indeed, the design of robust BITs provides an opportunity to address the problems common in aircraft FDI.
The term built-in test refers to system-integrated methods of FDI used for system health checks during start up, normal operation, and maintenance [16] , [30] . There are two main classifications of BIT: manual BIT and automatic BIT. Manual BIT is a manual system health check that is utilized during start up or maintenance and often originates from a detected abnormality during operation. In this test, maintenance personnel verify the state of a line LRU with various system components such as switches, lights, and meters and other ground support equipment. This method of fault detection is used in relatively simple systems containing few LRUs, in which conclusions on faults can be easily made [16] . Complications of using manual BIT occur when systems and subsystems have interconnecting components that can produce similar system responses for different faults. Automatic BIT is an automated system health check that is utilized during start-up, operation, and/or maintenance, and is a common, advanced BIT used in modern cyber-physical systems. Fully automatic BIT (i.e., continuous BIT or CBIT) runs continuously during system operation, displaying or storing faults that occur in real time. Fully automatic BITs do not interfere with the normal system operation unless they apply fault-tolerant control. Often, fault isolation is not feasible within the nominal operating space of the aircraft, which is usually addressed through manually initiated BITs. These tests (i.e., initiated/instantiated BIT or IBIT) are ran during maintenance and indicate detected and isolated faults at their conclusion [16] . IBITs are executed at relaxed performance requirements, allowing the admissible aircraft inputs to extend outside their nominal range, within safety bounds, in order to improve FDI capabilities. Therefore, robust IBIT designs (the conditions at which IBIT is executed) are feasible and potentially capable of reducing maintenance costs associated with NFF occurrences and improving system availability, dependability, and reliability [1] , [6] , [7] .
C. ACTIVE FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
The majority of IBITs developed today utilize analytical redundancy (i.e., model-based or data-based), providing the benefits of low cost passive and active FDI [10] , [17] . Model-based methods of FDI have gathered a lot of attention, likely due to the widespread use of models in system and control design. These methods take prior knowledge of the system to develop model equations that describe its behavior over a wide operating region. The models are then used to test system measurements against their anticipated values to detect and isolate anomalies and faults. However, a requirement and challenge in the deployment of model-based approaches is their robustness with respect to model error, system noise, and unknown inputs.
The majority of FDI research in recent decades has focused on passive methods trying to tackle this challenge of robustness [1] - [13] , [31] , [32] . Passive FDI methods analyze the system during normal operation and detect anomalies from an anticipated behavior when they occur. State of the art passive FDI methods, such as the observer-based adaptive fuzzy control discussed by Zhou et al. [33] , [34] and the mixed H ∞ and passive control discussed by Zheng and Zhang [35] , Zheng et al. [36] , and are well-established for handling uncertainty and tracking system states in the control of non-linear switching systems. They provide the benefit of stable control in the events of disturbances and are often used to detect and isolate fault(s). However, the detectability of a fault during normal closed-loop operation is not necessarily robust and depends on system conditions and fault severity [37] , [38] .
To further improve robustness, active FDI methods [37] - [46] have been of interest in the last decade. Active FDI methods manipulate system inputs to establish ideal conditions for the detection and isolation of faults [37] , making them an attractive option for improving IBIT and reducing NFFs. In fact, model-based active FDI methods can utilize their models a priori to determine the optimal operating point(s) or trajectories for IBIT execution.
D. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK
Optimization-based FDI methods have also gathered attention recently in an effort to improve robustness [14] , [32] , [47] - [55] . The majority of these methods focus on improving fault detection by designing robust and optimal filters, thresholds, and sensor placements. Here, we focus on the dependence of observed system outputs on the operating point and propose an active FDI method that optimally detects and isolates several discrete faults, improving IBIT robustness. The proposed method is formulated as a constrained optimization problem with the admissible system inputs as the manipulated variables and the generation of uniquely measurable system responses to individual faults and sets of faults as the objective. These optimal admissible system inputs can lie outside the normally deployed system control logic (e.g., startup, normal operation, maintenance), extending it to new system-safe operating modes for the specific objective of FDI. This method is applied to an aircraft environmental control system with indirectly measurable discrete faults to improve maintenance procedures (i.e., IBIT).
In summary, this paper aims to mathematically define a general formulation for model-based active FDI and present its deployment through IBIT design and execution. In Section II, we provide the basic problem formulation for active FDI cast as an optimization problem. In Section III, we describe an aircraft environmental control system and illustrate the need for active FDI with multiple case studies. In Section IV, we present an application and the benefits of the proposed method. Finally, in Section V, we conclude with the findings of this work and discuss open problems for future consideration.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
The proposed model-based FDI method involves two different mathematical descriptions of a system: one that is clean (fault-free) and one that contains fault(s). The two models are identical in structure, differing only in the faults present. It is assumed that the ''virtual system'' model is free of error, which is reasonable for systems of similar size to the one studied in this work. Although, the handling of model error and input uncertainty is the focus of future work. It is also assumed that the parameters representing faults are perfectly accurate representations of these faults, which is a reasonable assumption for discrete faults of the type discussed herein.
The formulation presented here focuses on FDI at steady state. This is acceptable and more realistic for maintenance due to the inaccuracy of transient data. We have presented work elsewhere [56] on the benefits of dynamic or transient tests in FDI. However, the use of transients in a real system requires perfect actuators, an understanding of the impact of system dynamics on states and uncertainty, and a more comprehensive FDI execution mechanism (sequence of control actions in closed-loop system operation), which are often infeasible or undesired for the systems studied in this work. For instance, a common fear in aerospace industry is that excitations due to changing inputs lead to false alarms, because of the complexity and limited understanding of the integrated system. Therefore, tests at steady state, if capable of producing distinct fault maps, are more desirable to maintenance procedures because the improved data accuracy can lead to more robust conclusions during fault detection and isolation, which is what this paper is trying to address.
A. MODEL EQUATIONS
The steady state algebraic equations that describe the clean system are noted as follows:
where f is the set of governing equations describing the system, x 0 ∈ X 0 ⊂ R N x is the vector of clean system states, u ∈ U ⊂ R N u is the vector of admissible system inputs, The model of the system containing an individual fault or set of faults F * , described here as the ''virtual system'', is expressed as:
where x * ∈ X * ⊂ R N x is the vector of system states and θ * f ∈ θ * f ⊂ R N θ f is the vector of parameters representing faults corresponding to F * . The faults were injected in the form of model parameters, altered from their nominal values. The starred ( * ) symbols in (2) and in the following equations express the reference values in response to anticipated faults and their parameters θ * f . For both models, we assume that because of the tightly constrained operating space of aircraft systems, the solution of (1) and (2) for a given set of inputs and parameters is unique in its state variables x 0 and x * . The clean system anticipated outputs and the ''virtual system'' measured outputs are expressed, respectively, as:
where h is the set of equations mapping the vector of clean system anticipated outputs y 0 ∈ Y 0 ⊂ R N y and the vector of ''virtual system'' measured outputs y * (n s ) ∈ Y * ⊂ R N y , to system states, inputs, and parameters and w(n s ) ∈ W ⊂ R N y is the vector of normally distributed white noise applied to the ''virtual system'' measured outputs at each sampling point n s of one steady state condition.
B. FEATURES AND SYMPTOMS GENERATION
The ''virtual system'' measured outputs can be compared to the clean system anticipated outputs using a statistical function over all sampling points to generate FDI features:
where s * ∈ T * ⊂ R N y is the vector of features and φ is the statistical function used to identify deviations from anticipated behavior. In this work, the maximum absolute value of the residuals r * (n s ) ∈ R * ⊂ R N y over the IBIT duration was assumed to be a sufficient metric for φ in (5) to develop the features s * = max
When developing the features above, the clean system anticipated outputs y 0 are repeated N s times and shown as y 0 (n s ) to match the vector size of the ''virtual system'' measured outputs, which are time-dependent because of noise. In the presence of model uncertainty, measurement noise, and input disturbance, statistical analyses described by Joe Qin [57] can replace the chosen φ in (5) to develop more robust features without affecting the functionality of the method presented here. More robust statistical tests include averages, sum of the squared residuals, and sample counting (declaring a symptom after a predetermined percentage of samples exceed the threshold).
The features of (5) can be used to identify the symptoms of a system that correspond to changes in measured outputs due to fault(s), shown later in Section III. The individual elements of the features vector s * are compared to their respective elements of the vector of thresholds, λ ∈ Λ ⊂ R N y , to create a vector of symptoms S ∈ Z N y :
where s * i is the feature, λ i is the threshold of the i th feature, ''0'' indicates that all sampling points of the absolute value residual are within its threshold, and ''1'' indicates that at least one sampling point of the absolute value residual crosses its threshold. Discussed further in Section III-D, these thresholds define a level of expected deviation from the anticipated outputs given the knowledge of typical system noise and uncertainty:
where
⊂ R N y is the vector of nominal thresholds and ∆λ ∈ ∆Λ ⊂ R N y is the vector of threshold increments corresponding to changes in operating points. In this work, the vector of threshold increments is held constant ∆λ(x 0 , u, θ p ) = ∆λ. We consider that constant thresholds have already been provided for FDI (in the form shown in (7) and (8)) using the method described by Frank and Köppen-Seliger [58] or some other method. For the ECS system studied here, these thresholds are presented later in Table 3 .
For complex systems that require improved analysis for FDI, the signs of the residuals can be used to further characterize a system symptom in hopes of better isolating faults. Sharifi and Langari highlight an additional method that utilizes directional residuals to improve sensor fault diagnostics [59] . In this work, two new features from (5) 
and s * ,U = max
is the vector of lower-value features and s * ,U ∈ T * ,U ⊂ R N y is the vector of upper-value features. These two features are used to develop a more descriptive vector of symptoms, as follows:
where s * ,L i is the lower feature, s * ,U i is the upper feature and λ i is the threshold of the i th feature. In this more descriptive symptoms vector ''0'' indicates that all sampling points of the residual are within its thresholds, ''1'' indicates that at least one sampling point of the residual crosses its threshold in the positive direction whereas the remaining sampling points are within its thresholds, ''−1'' indicates that at least one sampling point of the residual crosses its threshold in the negative direction whereas the remaining sampling points are within its thresholds, and '2'' indicates that at least one sampling point of the residual crosses its threshold in the positive direction and at least another sampling point of the residual crosses its threshold in the negative direction. This more complicated symptoms vector describes the direction of change in the ''virtual system'' model outputs from the clean system anticipated outputs, due to the occurrence of fault(s).
C. DECISION ON FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
The challenge after detecting a symptom is to isolate its fault cause. The method of isolation considered here, is to use the clean and ''virtual system'' models to create an N y × N f dimensional (number of measured outputs by number of faults) reference symptoms map S ref ∈ Z N y ×N f that describes the anticipated system symptom(s) in response to each fault or set of faults for a given set of inputs. Fault isolation then translates in practice to an activity of symptoms vector matching, where the symptoms vector of the system with unknown health S is compared to a reference symptoms vector S * ref to determine if the corresponding fault F * is present. This activity is executed for every fault or combination of faults in the reference symptoms map.
The generated symptoms vectors of (6) and (9) describe the health status of the system and are used to detect and isolate the fault(s) present, as shown below:
where d is the decision regarding the system health and faults present, S * ref ∈ Z N y is the vector of reference symptoms 50962 VOLUME 6, 2018 corresponding to fault(s) F * , generated from the ''virtual system'', ''0'' expresses that no fault is detected, ''1'' expresses that a fault is isolated (presuming S * ref is unique), and ''−1'' expresses the possibility of a fault being detected from a non-zero symptoms vector (e.g., S = [1, 0, 1, 0, 1] T ) yet does not match the reference symptoms vector of any fault considered in the preliminary analysis, and therefore can not be isolated. This could be the result of an unexpected fault not previously studied or system uncertainty.
D. INITIATED BUILT-IN TEST DESIGN FOR IMPROVED FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
The term IBIT design describes the determination of system maintenance test procedures (mainly involving the manipulation of the admissible inputs) that examine the health of the system and detect and isolate the present fault(s). As mentioned in Section I, the variability of the inputs during maintenance is greater than the variability during operation, due to relaxed performance and safety requirements. When designing IBITs, the following options for tuning a test are often available: the number of tests (sets of inputs) N test ; the duration of these tests τ; their dynamic responses; the frequency and type of sensors used; the statistical functions φ and thresholds λ used to analyze the system features and develop symptoms; and the admissible inputs u.
To optimally design an IBIT for a system, given the flexibility in tuning options, a mathematical formulation that maximizes the number of unique symptoms vectors in the reference symptoms map can be constructed using any or all of these tuning options as the manipulated variable(s). The simplest formulation of IBIT as an optimization problem is shown below, using only the admissible inputs u as the manipulated variables. The number of tests N test was also included in the formulation to achieve complete fault isolation, as discussed later:
where Q is the objective function/optimality criterion defined as the number of unique symptoms vectors in the designed reference symptoms map S ref and U is the matrix of admissible system inputs. The number of unique symptoms vectors is calculated using the function ''unique,'' which takes the original matrix S ref and forms a reduced matrix of all the symptoms vectors in the original matrix that are different. The row size of this reduced matrix is maximized by (11) . The aim of (11) is to develop the largest feasible reference symptoms map that contains unique symptoms vectors. This is accomplished by solving for the sets of admissible inputs that create the largest number of unique symptoms vectors for each fault or combinations of faults in the reference symptoms map. The IBIT formulation of (11) is subject to: the set of governing equations of (1) and (3) that represent the clean system model and its respective anticipated outputs, the set of governing equations of (2) and (4) that represent the ''virtual system'' (with fault F j present) and its respective noisy measured outputs, the FDI features of (5), the thresholds of (7) and (8) (Table 3) , the symptoms vector development of (6) , and the state and input bounds. These constraints are applied for all sampling points n s = 1, . . . , N s , analyzed outputs i = 1, . . . , N y , faults j = 1, . . . , N f , and input sets k = 1, . . . , N test . The result of the optimization problem of (11) is the set of admissible inputs U opt that produces the most unique reference symptoms map S opt ref .
It is important to note that the states of both the clean system and ''virtual system'' must be kept within the bounds set by either safety, physical, or performance limitations.
If (11) is unable to result in a reference symptoms map that is fully isolating, then more of the tuning options listed prior to (11) should be added to the optimization problem to reach this goal. A slightly more complex formulation of IBIT as an optimization problem is shown below, using both the admissible inputs u and number of tests N test as the manipulated variables similar to before, with added rigor to the development of symptoms:
Similar to (11) , the aim of (12) is to develop the largest feasible reference symptoms map that contains unique symptoms vectors. This is once again accomplished by solving for the set(s) of admissible inputs that create the largest number of unique symptoms vectors for each fault or combinations of faults in the reference symptoms map. The IBIT formulation of (12) is subject to the same equations and constraints as (11) , with a change in the symptoms vector development, using (9) instead of (6). The result of the optimization problem of (12) is also the set of admissible inputs U opt that produces the most unique reference symptoms map S opt ref .
The optimization problems of (11) and (12) were formalized with appropriate ECS state and input constraints and solved as an optimal IBIT design with results discussed in Section IV. The input constraints were based upon physical and design limitations of the ECS (i.e., valve fully opened or closed, compressor speed at maximum or minimum), as reported in Tables 5 and 8 . The model equations (1) to (4) were exported from Dymola R [60] to MATLAB R [61] as a Functional Mock-up Unit using the Functional Mock-up Interface [62] (a multi-platform standard for describing dynamic models). The Modelon R FMIToolbox [63] was used to import the Functional Mock-up Unit into MATLAB R where the optimal IBIT design was solved for using MATLAB R OPTI Toolbox's Nonlinear Optimization with Mesh Adaptive Direct Search algorithm (NOMAD). This algorithm is capable of solving the global, non-differentiable, mixed integer non-linear programming problem of (11) and (12) (i.e., discontinuous model components, discrete fault parameters, black box model, mixed integer non-linear program) [64] . However, it should be noted that these problems are very computationally complex mainly due to the high-fidelity models and the integer-based objective function. The objective function contains many local solutions/plateaus that result in lack of global convergence and make it difficult to find a solution. This was addressed by utilizing the stochastic solver NOMAD along with a crude multi-start approach to the optimization problems (11) and (12) to avoid regions of ill convergence.
III. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE OF AN AEROSPACE SUBSYSTEM
The system studied in this work is a subsystem of an aircraft environmental control system (ECS). The primary objective of the ECS is to provide fresh air at appropriate conditions to the aircraft passengers and crew and perform secondary heating and cooling of various aircraft components [65] . ECSs of modern MEAs condition the outside air with a dedicated compressor. This allows for better efficiency, reduced fuel consumption, and improved maintainability [18] , [20] . Figure 1 shows the piping and instrumentation diagram of the ECS subsystem studied in this work [20] , [65] . 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The ECS subsystem studied here contains two main components: a variable speed/geometry compressor and a recycle valve. The compressor develops pressurized flow from the ambient air and the valve recycles a fraction of this pressurized air back to the compressor inlet to further adjust its temperature and also protect the compressor from surge. There are four admissible system inputs: compressor rotational speed, valve position, variable diffuser (VD) position, and system outlet pressure (ECS downstream pressure). The system outlet pressure is indirectly controlled by the ECS downstream components (e.g., valves) and the cabin pressure schedule. Its impact is captured in the model as a boundary condition. The system has the following four measured variables, from the sensors shown in Fig. 1 : compressor outlet temperature, system outlet mass flow, compressor outlet pressure, and compressor inlet pressure. There is also a fifth calculated output, the compressor surge margin, which is a function of the compressor inlet pressure, compressor outlet pressure, and system outlet mass flow. The inlet temperature to the system is known from a measurement upstream the air compression system (not shown in Fig. 1) .
B. CLEAN SYSTEM MODEL
A physics-based model that reasonably captures the thermal fluid properties and behavior of the system presented in Fig. 1 was developed as shown in Fig. 2 . The system was modeled using the object-oriented equation-based language Modelica R [69] within the dynamic modeling and simulation software environment of Dymola R [60] . The model was developed using a combination of components from the Modelon R 2.0 commercial library [63] , the Modelica Standard Library, a custom-made variable speed and geometry compressor with surge margin calculation, and a custom-made ambient air state model. The blue arrows on the left-hand side of the model shown in Fig. 2 are the admissible system inputs and the white arrows on the right-hand side are the measured outputs. This model was validated with data from an ECS subsystem of the United Technologies Aerospace Systems. Fig. 2 is a dynamic compressor (i.e., a centrifugal, axial compressor) simulated as isentropic with quasi-static mass and energy balances, solved according to a compressor performance map. The compressor model includes a VD calculation that adjusts the flow rate of the compressor depending on its position. The VD is similar to a guide vane on a variable geometry compressor where, at a constant rotational speed and pressure ratio, opening the VD increases the mass flow rate of the compressor. The valve of the system is simulated as isenthalpic with quasi-static mass and energy balances, solved by assuming a linear correlation between the valve state (i.e., position, upstream pressure, and downstream pressure) and design (i.e., nominal mass flow rate when fully open for a given pressure drop). The inlet conditions to the ECS were held constant at standard atmospheric conditions (288.50 K and 101325 Pa), representing an aircraft during ground maintenance.
The compressor of the ECS presented in

C. FAULTY ''VIRTUAL SYSTEM'' MODEL
A ''virtual system'' model (2) was used to represent the faulty system. This ''virtual system'' model has the same structure as the clean system model (1) shown in Fig. 2 , but with measurement noise and fault injection. Normally distributed white noise was determined from the uncertainty and noise levels of the system sensors and added to the ''virtual system'' model with standard deviations of 2.50 K , 50.00 Pa and 0.01 kg/s for the temperature, pressure, and mass flow sensors, respectively. Table 1 presents the eight common aircraft ECS faults studied along with their respective fault parameter values. These faults were separately injected into the ''virtual system'' model and assumed to be constant throughout the IBIT. It was also assumed that no faults other than those studied existed or appeared in the system during the IBIT. The first three faults analyzed, F 1 −F 3 , represent a failure in valve operation, becoming stuck closed, in the mid position or open. The next three faults, F 4 − F 6 , represent a failure in the compressor VD operation, also becoming stuck closed, in the mid position or open. The last individual fault analyzed was a failure in the ECS mass flow sensor, having developed a bias. The final fault studied, F 8 , was a combination of the previous individual faults, F 3 , F 4 , and F 7 , now simultaneously present. For brevity, only one combination of faults was studied, but more combinations can be added to this analysis without restriction.
D. MOTIVATION FOR IMPROVED FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
Residuals of the available system measurements were generated and evaluated for FDI from the responses of the ''virtual system'' injected with the faults of Table 1 and the corresponding responses of the clean system. These residuals should be close to zero in a clean (fault-free) system and should deviate from zero in a faulty system. A fault symptom was flagged as a boolean index depending on whether or not its statistically significant residual exceeds a pre-determined threshold [12] , [57] . These symptoms were combined into a vector, referred to as the symptoms vector in (6) , to provide information on the system health status. Analyzing the matrix of symptoms vectors for all faults, termed a symptoms map, can provide further insight on the capability for fault isolation. Analogous to the symptom map is the incidence matrix, described in Staroswiecki [15] , which shows the functional relationship between certain variables VOLUME 6, 2018 or characteristics. In this work, the symptoms map is in essence a binary matrix referred to in FDI that expresses how faults are evidenced in the ECS at a predetermined operating point.
To motivate the need for optimal IBIT design and illustrate the impact of the admissible system inputs on FDI capabilities, three case studies with inputs within their allowable range were studied. Faults were injected to the ''virtual system'' and their impact on and propagation to the other components of the system were explored. Figure 3 presents the simulator configuration used for these case studies. The blocks at the left-hand side of the figure show the system inputs sent to the ''virtual system'' model (highlighted in red) and the clean system model (highlighted in green). The outputs of both models were used to generate FDI residuals for this system, shown as the arrows at the right-hand side of Fig. 3 . The availability of aircraft computational power sets limits to the use of more intelligent detection mechanisms during FDI deployment. Therefore, in this work we focus on developing an active FDI method that utilizes a high-fidelity model for the design of the BIT and a simple logic for the detection during BIT deployment and execution. The ''virtual system'' model with the faults of Table 1 and the clean system model were simulated to steady state at the conditions corresponding to the admissible system inputs shown in Table 2 . Features describing the ''virtual system'' were developed by taking the maximum absolute value of the residuals over the duration of the test. These features were compared to the constant residual thresholds of Table 3 for fault symptom flagging. If a fault symptom is flagged, it is expressed as 1 in the symptoms vector; otherwise, the fault symptom is expressed as 0. The method presented in Section II assumes a single violation of the thresholds for the detection and isolation of a fault. More intelligent methods can be used when mapping faults, such as the moving average or a common industry employed consecutive sample counting method (e.g., +3 for a sample above threshold, -1 for a sample underneath threshold, and a total of 10 indicates detection), to improve robustness, as discussed in Section II-B. As threshold design is outside the scope of this work and often comes as a customer requirement, the constant thresholds designed here were selected with consideration of the noise and uncertainty of the system at nominal operating conditions (which involve several different flight schedules) and define an allowable level of deviation of the fault-free ''virtual system'' outputs from their anticipated mean values.
Instead of being constant, the thresholds could also be designed at each operating point or by using common thresholding techniques such as adaptive thresholding, when uncertainty, noise, and model error also change with the operating point. However, thresholds in the aerospace industry come in the form of constraints, which in turn come as requirements by the customer (the airframer in the case of the ECS studied here). These thresholds may or may not be able to change/adapt to operating points, as they are often hard constraints determined by upstream or downstream system health and safety. Because we are trying to solve a realistic problem that might be more constrained than the theoretical problem, often for good reasons, the constant thresholds utilized here are sufficient and relevant to the intended application. An advantage of the proposed method is that it optimizes the maintenance test using the actual metrics/methods used for detection and isolation during test deployment/execution.
The symptoms vectors of each fault were generated and compiled into symptoms maps for each operating point as shown in Table 4 . It is clear from Table 4 that the capability to detect and isolate faults depends strongly on the system operating point. The changes to the symptom maps at each operating point in Table 4 are, in part, due to the constant nature of the thresholds chosen and the increase or decrease in amplitude of the residuals due to the new system conditions. For example, in case study SS #1 the majority of faults in the system were non-detectable (i.e., their residuals were close to zero) at the given set of system inputs. This is shown by the reference symptoms map of mostly zeros in Table 4 . It should be noted that a fault is considered to be non-detectable if its symptoms vector is all zeros. In case study SS #2, an improvement in detection can be seen from the introduction of non-zero symptoms vectors for faults F 1 , F 3 , F 5 , and F 8 . However, all of the faults display the same symptom at the operating conditions of SS #2, causing problems with isolation. In case study SS #3, there is further improvement in fault detection and isolation when compared to the other two case studies. As can be seen in Table 4 , case study SS #3 provides improved fault detection over SS #1, because of the increased number of non-zero symptoms vectors in the symptoms map, and improved fault isolation over SS #2, because its symptoms map contains unique symptoms vectors between the faults F 1 /F 4 , F 2 /F 3 /F 8 , and F 7 . However, even in this case study faults F 5 and F 6 are non-detected and the isolation of faults F 1 from F 4 , and F 2 , F 3 , and F 8 from each other was not feasible.
It can be concluded from this preliminary analysis that the FDI capabilities of a system depend on its inputs. An optimization problem should therefore be formulated to determine the set of inputs that maximizes FDI capabilities, as is described in Section II and presented in Section IV. The optimal solution to this problem has the potential to eliminate the scenarios when faults are not evident in the system outputs, because of the maintenance test conditions, subsequently eliminating costly occurrences of NFFs and misdiagnoses.
IV. DESIGN OF IBIT FOR A SUBSYSTEM OF AN AIRCRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
In this section, the equations presented in Section II are applied to the ECS described in Section III. Assessments on the optimal IBIT designs of (11) and (12) are made in their capability to improve the detection and isolation of discrete faults from the results in Section III. The optimal IBIT design is sought to maximize the fault isolation capability of the system, described in this paper as the uniqueness of the reference symptoms map.
A. INITIAL OPTIMAL IBIT DESIGN
An initial study solving (11) and (12) with a single input set 1 (N test ∈ Γ = {1}) was conducted to determine the isolation capability of the simplest tests. Table 5 shows the optimal inputs for (11) and (12) and Tables 6 and 7 show   TABLE 5 . IBIT design constraints and optimal inputs solution to the IBIT design problem of (11) and (12). their respective reference symptoms maps. With N test = 1, the solution to (11) resulted in inputs that produced unique system responses and formed an optimal reference symptoms map (see Table 6 ) capable of detecting 6 of the 8 faults studied, which is an improvement over the 3 faults that could be detected using the reference symptoms map at SS #1 of Table 4 .
This optimal reference symptoms map also contained unique symptoms vectors for faults F 1 /F 8 , F 2 /F 4 and F 5 /F 7 , allowing for isolation from one another. However, even at the optimal solution, F 2 and F 6 are non-detected and the isolation of F 1 from F 8 , F 2 from F 4 , and F 5 from F 7 is still not feasible. By comparing this solution to the solution of (12) we can observe the benefits from using the sign of the residuals to characterize symptoms, in terms of improved isolation capability. Table 7 shows the optimal reference symptoms map for the solution to (12) with N test = 1. This optimal reference symptoms map is capable of detecting 6 out of the 8 faults studied, similar to the previous map. However, an improvement is seen in the uniqueness of the symptoms vectors. All 6 of the detected faults have unique symptoms vectors and can therefore be isolated from one another, fixing the problem of isolation of F 1 from F 8 , F 2 from F 4 , and F 5 from F 7 .
As can be seen from Tables 6 and 7 , two of the 8 faults studied could not be detected (F 3 and F 6 ). This is poor from a maintenance point of view as non-detections prove to be costly and are a major safety concern. Therefore, the number of tests (i.e., number of input sets) needs to be increased from N test = 1 in order to fully detect and isolate the analyzed faults. Increasing the number of tests corresponds to a more complex maintenance procedure and longer test duration, which can be problematic in time sensitive industries such as aerospace, but proves to be beneficial in terms of improving isolation capability. It is worth noting that these optimal tests do not need to be sequentially run during a single (continuous) maintenance period. For example, if one of the sets of inputs is reached during operation then the system responses can be saved for isolation purposes and recalled when the remaining input sets are reached during future operation or maintenance procedures. Table 8 shows the input constraints and the optimal set of inputs calculated from solving the complete IBIT design problem of (11) . To achieve complete isolation, several enumerations for the number of input sets (N test ∈ Γ = {1, 2, 3}) in (11) were solved for and the minimum number of tests that resulted in a unique reference symptoms map was chosen (the results of N test = 1 were shown previously). It was determined that N test = 2 was the smallest value, for the given TABLE 8. IBIT design constraints and optimal input sets solution to the IBIT design problem of (11).
B. FULLY DETECTING AND ISOLATING IBIT
system architecture (i.e., sensors) and analyzed faults, that provided complete detection and isolation. With N test = 2, all studied faults could be detected and isolated with two separate optimal IBITs (i.e., operating points, U opt ). For this reason, (12) was not solved because the isolation capability could not be further improved. Figure 4 shows the system responses for each of the faults studied at the optimal set of inputs, plotted as the absolute value of residuals between the noisy/faulty ''virtual system'' measurements and the clean estimated system measurements. The dotted red lines in Fig. 4 are the thresholds of Table 3 . These thresholds are presented to enclose a shaded region of acceptable deviation between model and measurements. Two figures are shown because of the two sets of inputs required to achieve full isolation (i.e., completely unique symptoms vectors) of the system with the given thresholds.
The responses from the two sets of inputs were compiled to an optimal reference symptoms map of size N test · N y × N f (2 · 5 × 8) using (6) . For clarity of the symptoms vector uniqueness over the two input sets, the two individual symptoms maps were concatenated as shown in Table 9 . The optimal concatenated reference symptoms map contains unique symptoms vectors for faults F 1 through F 8 . This means that each of these faults can be isolated from one another on the basis of their unique system responses. With this information, an optimal IBIT (or series of optimal IBITs over time) can be executed during maintenance and more accurate conclusions can be made on the health status of the ECS at the FDI-optimal operating points, reducing NFF occurrences. 
C. IMPACT OF OPTIMAL BUILT-IN TEST ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
Finally, it is of interest to examine the inputs of the optimal IBIT design and understand the validity of the solution. The optimization brought the ECS to conditions at which each Table 1 and set of inputs in Table 8 . The two pressure measurement residuals were omitted to reduce the figure size because they were insensitive: (a) optimal input set 1, u 10%) ; however, this deviation is significant for faults F 1 (valve stuck closed) and F 3 (valve stuck open), with F 3 having the larger deviation of the two because the anticipated valve opening is further away from its faulty value (a difference of 60% as opposed to 40%).
In the second input set, when the valve is commanded to be fully open, F 3 is unnoticeable because the anticipated and faulty valve openings are identical so no deviations of the measurements from their anticipated values exists. It is also worth noting that there is significant deviations for F 2 now because the anticipated valve opening is further away from the faulty value (a difference of 50%) and F 1 shows the greatest deviation due to the anticipated valve opening (u 2,2 = 1.00) being the furthest away from the faulty value (a difference of 100%).
For the mass flow sensor fault F 7 (bias), the optimization problem kept the compressor speed in the mid to upper bound region to maintain a high mass flow, while still allowing variability in system responses between the two input sets. Since the bias injected is percentage-based, the larger mass flow leads to a larger bias and corresponding deviation. Similarly, the optimal design for the VD set it to be at its near halfway position first and nearly open position subsequently (u 3,1 = 0.40, u 3,2 = 0.90). At the midway VD position, there are minor but noticeable deviations for faults F 4 (stuck closed) and F 6 (stuck open), similar to the faulty valve responses. However, the temperature deviations are more sensitive to valve failures, because the valve recycles high temperature air to the compressor inlet, which is why a temperature symptom S ref ,1,1 exists for F 3 and not F 6 . At the near fully open VD position, fault F 4 is very noticeable because the position is furthest away from its expected value (VD stuck closed while the ECS is trying to position it at near fully open). Fault F 5 also showed minor deviations at this position whereas fault F 6 was not noticeable. One of the key pieces to this optimal IBIT design is the fact that the second input set is at the upper bound for valve opening, but not for the VD position (u 2,2 = 1.00, u 3,2 = 0.90). This slight deviation helps distinguish the valve and VD faults from each other, as can be seen in Fig. 4b , particularly in the comparison of the surge margin plots r SM between faults F 1 and F 4 .
D. THE VALUE, APPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS OF IBIT DESIGN
In summary, we have demonstrated a method for the design of effective steady-state maintenance tests. The value of this method lies in the ability to develop distinct system responses for each anticipated fault, using a model structure identical to that utilized for system and control design. Limitations of the proposed method include the potentially cumbersome computational complexity of models of large systems, the mixed-integer non-linear objective function formulated for FDI design, issues with model accuracy and uncertainty, and the lack of theoretical guarantees for global optimality. Work is currently underway to alleviate these limitations of the method. For instance, computational complexity can be addressed with use of a continuous objective function such as the combined Euclidean distance of the residual vectors for every fault. Another extension of the proposed method would be to develop dynamic maintenance tests that use derivative information in the fault mapping. Development of robust global optimization algorithms that can handle this class of problems is also underway [70] .
Practical constraints of the aerospace industry often render conventional FDI methods inapplicable. Nonetheless, the method proposed here can be extended to utilize developments in more intelligent modeling and filtering techniques in place of the clean system and ''virtual system'' models of Fig. 3 , with the corresponding filters augmented to their respective outputs for residual generation. For example, the Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy dynamic modeling and observer-based filtering technique used by Li et al. [71] can be leveraged to improve the robustness of the proposed method. Moreover, the closed-loop passive FDI methods such as those discussed in [33] - [36] and the open-loop IBIT design method described here can be combined sequentially to improve passive fault detection and isolation followed by active maintenance testing to verify/identify/isolate the faults detected in real-time.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A new method for built-in test design using model-based active FDI was proposed and demonstrated for an aircraft thermal fluid system. For this first-level analysis, the model was assumed to be void of error and the system was assumed to be free of uncertainty. The responses of the system to various faults were optimized by manipulation of the system admissible inputs, with the objective to maximize the number of unique symptoms vectors in a reference symptoms map. The unique system reference symptoms map is the anticipated collective set of measurements that can be compared with actual system data to decide about the health status of a system. Given system constraints, anticipated faults, test duration, number of admissible inputs, and system sensors and their allowable thresholds, the methodology presented here provides a formal best estimate of the fault detection and isolation capability of the system. It was concluded that unique symptoms vectors exist for all of the fault cases studied, providing perfect detection and isolation capability. Future work will focus on addressing some of the method limitations such as incorporating model error and system uncertainty in the proposed formulation to improve its robustness. The limitations of this method are the computational complexity and size of the problem for an entire system with ample faults. Objective function change could improve results and tackle issues with optimization.
APPENDIX A TERMINOLOGY
See Table 10.   TABLE 10 . Common terminology used throughout the paper established by the aerospace community [5] , [16] , [17] . 
APPENDIX B NOMENCLATURE
